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PASSENGER FOR CONSIDERATION IN
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
ROBERT L. TAYLORt
With the increase of automobile accidents during the past few
years and the increase of litigation resulting therefrom, auto-
mobile liability insurance has assumed a new importance. It is
the one means of protection which the average automobile owner
and operator may secure against vexatious personal injury liti-
gation arising out of automobile accidents. Indeed, even that
does not always protect the insured.
The increasing importance of automobile liability insurance
is shown not only by the increase in the number of such policies
written, but also by legislation making such insurance prac-
tically compulsory. In 1925, Massachusetts passed a compulsory
liability insurance act1 which in brief requires that every appli-
cant for registration of a motor vehicle must present a certi-
ficate showing that such motor vehicle is covered by a liability
bond or liability insurance policy running for a period coter-
minous with the registration. These bonds or policies must pro-
vide indemnity against loss to the insured, and to any person
operating or responsible for the operation of the vehicle with
his express or implied consent, to the amount of $5,000 for
the death or injury of any one person, and $10,000 for the
death or injury of more than one person in any one accident.
In lieu of bond or policy an applicant may deposit cash or se-
curities in the sum of $5,000 with the state. Prior to the enact-
ment of this measure the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, at
the request of the legislature, rendered an advisory opinion2 in
which the act was held constitional in every particular as a regu-
lation of the highways in the public interest.
In England similar legislation has been enacted 3 providing
t A.B., Yale University, 1927; J.D., Northwestern University, 1930. As-
sociate Professor of Law, University of Louisville.
1. Mass. Cure. Stat. (1927) c. 175, sec. 113a. See Sleeper v. Massachu-
setts Bonding and Ins. Co. (1933) 283 Mass. 511, 186 N. E. 778, for a case
involving an insurance policy secured under the requirements of the Massa-
chusetts act.
2. In re Opinion of Justices (1925) 251 Mass. 569, 147 N. E. 681.
3. Road Traffic Act (1930) 20 & 21 George V, c. 43, part II, see. 35, sub-
div. 1.
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that it shall be unlawful for any person to use, or permit another
person to use, a motor vehicle on a road unless there is in
force, in relation to such user, a policy of insurance or such
security in respect to third-party risks as complies with the
requirements of the act.
In many of the states there have been enacted so-called finan-
cial responsibility laws making liability insurance practically
compulsory in the case of a serious accident. Typical of such
statutes is the one passed in New Hampshire' which provides
that immediately upon receipt of a report of an accident result-
ing in bodily injury or death, or in property damage exceeding
$25, the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles shall suspend the
license of the person operating, and the registration certificate
and plates of the person owning, the motor vehicle involved
in such accident. The suspension continues unless or until the
operator or owner, or both, shall have furnished proof of finan-
cial responsibility in the amount of $5,000 for bodily injury or
death to one person, $10,000 for bodily injury or death to two
or more persons, $1,000 for property damage, and proof of
future maintenance of such financial responsibility. The motor
vehicle involved in such accident may not be registered in the
name of any other person unless such financial responsibility is
furnished by the operator or owner, or both, involved in such
accident. The same requirements are exacted of a non-resident
involved in such an accident in the state, and for his failure to
furnish such proof he is deprived of the right to operate a motor
vehicle in the state; and no other person may operate the auto-
mobile involved in such accident in the state. For a violation
of the act, the penalty provided is imprisonment for not more
than six months, or a fine of not more than $500, or both.
This increasing importance of automobile liability insurance
makes an analysis of the important provisions of the ordinary
policy not only interesting but extremely valuable to the present-
day owner or operator of an automobile; indeed, it is of impor-
tance to anyone who rides in a motor vehicle and even to the
pedestrian. Although most of the liability insurance policies
are substantially the same in form, there are certain differ-
4. N. H. Laws of 1937, c. 161. For other examples of financial respon-
sibility laws see Cal. Vehicle Code (1935) sec. 410-418; Ky. Carrol's
Stats. Ann. (1936) sees. 2739n(1-36); Ohio Gen. Code (1935) secs. 6298(1-25).
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ences in the language and scope of the policies issued by the
various companies. For this reason it is necessary for the par-
ticular policyholder to study his own policy to determine the
exact coverage which it affords.5
There appears in most policies of automobile insurance a pro-
vision against the renting of the insured vehicle and against its
use to carry passengers for compensation, 8 or for a considera-
tionj or for hire. 8 This provision has caused considerable diffi-
culty in litigation involving this type of insurance.9 In some
5. This was also true in policies which agreed to indemnify the assured
against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for damages on account
of death or bodily injuries caused by accident during the life of the policy,
suffered by any person, by reason of the use or maintenance of horses or
vehicles, while in the charge of the assured. For example, in Hygienic Ice
& Refrigerating Co. v. Philadelphia Casualty Co. (1914) 162 App. Div.
190, 147 N. Y. S. 754, aff'd 222 N. Y. 583, 118 N. E. 1063, the policy declara-
tion in behalf of the assured provided, among other things: "6. None of the
horses enumerated are used under the saddle, excepting. No exceptions.
7. All teams are used exclusively in assured's trade or business, excepting.
No exceptions. 8. The teams above mentioned are stabled at Albany, N. Y.
9. No vicious animal is used, so far as the assured knows, excepting. No
exceptions. 10. No person under sixteen years of age is or will be permitted
to drive * * * excepting. No exceptions."
6. Neilson v. American Mut. Liability Ins. Co. (1933) 111 N. J. L. 345,
168 Atl. 436; Orient Ins. Co. v. Van Zandt-Bruce Drug Co. (1915) 50 Okla.
558, 151 Pac. 323; Commercial Union Assur. Co. of London v. Hill, (Tex.
Civ. App. 1914) 167 S. W. 1095.
7. American Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co. v. Wilcox (D. C. W. D.
N. Y. 1936) 16 F. Supp. 799; Sleeper v. Massachusetts Bonding and Ins.
Co. (1933) 283 Mass. 511, 186 N. E. 778; Cartos v. Hartford Accident &
Indemnity Co. (1933) 160 Va. 505, 169 S. E. 594. In State Farm Mut.
Automobile Ins. Co. v. Self (C. C. A. 5, 1937) 93 F. (2d) 139, the court
distinguished the provision against carrying anyone for consideration from
the provision against carrying passengers for compensation as illustrated in
the case of Marks v. Home Fire & Marine Ins. Co. (App. D. C. 1923) 285
Fed. 959, 52 App. D. C. 225, stating that the former was a much more
comprehensive provision.
8. Crowell v. Maryland Motor Car Ins. Co. (1915) 169 N. C. 35, 85 S. E.
87, Ann. Cas. 1917D 50.
9. Controversies involving a provision of this nature may arise in sev-
eral ways: (1) Where the injured person is given a direct right against
the insurance company by virtue of local statutory provisions, see Williams
v. Nelson (1917) 228 Mass. 191, 117 N. E. 189; Lorando v. Gethro (1917)
228 Mass. 181, 117 N. E. 185; Lajoie v. Central West Casualty Co. (1934)
228 Mo. App. 701, 71 S. W. (2d) 803; Taverno v. American Auto Ins. Co.
(Mo. App. 1938) 112 5. W. (2d) 941; Maryland Casualty Co. v. Martin(1937) 88 N. H. 346, 189 Atl. 162; Rothman v. Metropolitan Casualty Ins.
Co. (1938) 134 Ohio St. 241, 16 N. E. (2d) 417; O'Donnell v. New Am-
sterdam Casualty Co. (1929) 50 R. I. 269, 146 Atl. 410; Wyatt v. Guildhall
Ins. Co., Ltd. (1937) 1 K. B. 653. See also Note (1933) 85 A. L. R. 20; Note
(1989) 48 Yale L. J. 908; through assignment by the insured, see Pietran-
tonio v. Travelers Ins. Co. (1937) 282 Mich. 111, 275 N. W. 786; or by
provision in the policy itself, see Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp., Ltd. v.
Torres (C. C. A. 9, 1937) 91 F. (2d) 464; State Farm Mut. Automobile
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Ins. Co. v. Self (C. C. A. 5, 1937) 93 F. (2d) 139. (2) Where the injured
party, armed with a judgment against the insured, proceeds by garnishment
against the insurer, see Maringer v. Bankers Indemnity Ins. Co. (1937)
288 Il. App. 335, 6 N. E. (2d) 307; Arms v. Faszholz (Mo. App. 1930) 32
S. W. (2d) 781; Gross v. Kubel (1934) 315 Pa. 396, 172 Atl. 649. (3)
Where the insured sues the insurer, see Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp.,
Ltd. v. Olson (C. C. A. 8, 1937) 87 F. (2d) 465; Western Machinery Co.
v. Baners Indemnity Ins. (1938) 10 Cal. (2d) 488, 75 P. (2d) 609. (4)
Where the insurance company seeks a declaratory judgment in order to
determine its liability, American Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty & Surety Co.
v. Odom (D. C. N. D. Tex. 1937) 21 F. Supp. 574; Ocean Accident & Guar-
antee Corp., Ltd. v. Myers (D. C. M. D. N. C. 1938) 22 F. Supp. 450;
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Hearn (1936) 233 Ala. 31, 170
So. 59; Maryland Casualty Co. v. Martin (1937) 88 N. H. 346, 189 Atl. 162.
(5) Where the injured party, unable to obtain satisfaction on a judgment
rendered against the insured, sues the insurance company, see Jensen v.
Canadian Indemnity Co. (C. C. A. 9, 1938) 98 F. (2d) 469; Yelin v. Col-
umbia Casualty Co. (1934) 265 N. Y. 590, 193 N. E. 334; Gross v. Kubel
(1934) 315 Pa. 396, 172 AtL 649, 95 A. L. R. 146. In the latter situation,
a recovery is limited to contracts of liability, see Walker v. New Amsterdam
Casualty Co. (1930) 157 S. C. 381, 154 S. E. 221; Roadbuilders' Hauling Co.
v. Constitution Indemnity Co. (1932) 165 S. C. 363, 163 S. E. 837; Fentress
v. Rutledge (1924) 140 Va. 685, 125 S. E. 668; Indemnity Ins. Co. v.
Davis' Adm'r (1928) 150 Va. 778, 143 S. E. 328. Such contracts are to
be distinguished from contracts of indemnity, where the insurance company
does not become liable until the judgment against the insured has been
paid, see Goodman v. Georgia Life Ins. Co. (1914) 189 Ala. 130, 66 So. 649;
Transylvania Casualty Ins. Co. v. Williams (1925) 209 Ky. 626, 273 S. W.
536; London & Lancashire Indemnity Co. v. Cosgriff (1924) 144 Md. 660,
125 Atl. 529; United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Williams (1925)
148 Md. 289, 129 Atl. 660. But see Note (1933) 85 A. L. R. 20, giving
statutory provisions prohibiting, in substance, the insertion in any con-
tract of casualty insurance of a condition that the insured must actually
pay the loss before liability attaches to the insurer. Where there is a
true contract of indemnity, the insurer is not liable if the insured is in-
solvent and has no property out of which a judgment might be satisfied,
see Transylvania Casualty Ins. Co. v. Williams (1925) 209 Ky. 626, 273
S. W. 536; American Automobile Ins. Co. v. Cone (Tex. Civ. App. 1923)
257 S. W. 961; Glatz v. Kroeger Bros. (1921) 175 Wis. 42, 183 N. W.
683; see also Note (1929) 59 A. L. R. 1123. So also if he has filed a
petition in brankruptcy, see Anderson v. American Automobile Ins. Co.
(1930) 50 R. I. 502, 149 Atl. 797; and see Note (1929) 59 A. L. R. 1123.
It should be noted that when the injured party sues the insurer, he is
not allowed to recover unless the insured had a cause of action against
the insurer, and therefore the injured party is subject to all the provisions
of the insurance policy. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp., Ltd. v. Myers(D. C. M. D. N. C. 1938) 22 F. Supp. 450; Western Machinery Co. v.
Bankers Indemnity Ins. Co. (1938) 10 Cal. (2d) 488, 75 P. (2d) 609;
Souza v. Car & General Assur. Corp., Ltd. (1932) 281 lass. 117, 183 N. E.
140; Sleeper v. Massachuetts Bonding & Ins. Co. (1933) 283 Mass. 511, 186
N. E. 778; Dziadosc v. American Casualty Co. (1934) 12 N. . Misc. 205,
171 Atl. 137; Venditti v. Mucciaroni (1936) 54 Ohio App. 513, 8 N. E.
(2d) 460.
Another provision in automobile liability insurance policies which is
frequently involved in litigation is the one which exempts the insurer from
lability where the insured car is being operated by one who is not legally
permitted to drive. McGee v. Globe Indemnity Co. (1934) 173 S. C. 380,
175 S. E. 849; Bailey v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. (1937) 185
S. C. 169, 193 S. E. 638; Holland Supply Corp. v. State Farm Mut. Auto-
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policies this provision appears in the form of a clause excluding
the obligation of the company while the automobile is so used. 0
In others the provision appears in the nature of a warranty"
which is usually promissory,1 2 but is sometimes affirmative,13 or
mobile Ins. Co. (1936) 166 Va. 331, 186 S. E. 56. Thus the insurance
company is not liable for injuries caused by the automobile while being
driven by a person in violation of the law as to age. Morrison v. Royal
Indemnity Co. (1917) 180 App. Div. 709, 167 N. Y. S. 732; Wagoner v.
Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York (1926) 215 App. Div. 170, 213 N. Y. S.
188, aff'd 253 N. Y. 608, 171 N. E. 803. This exemption clause applies
regardless of whether the owner of the car agreed or consented to such use,
as the company did not assume the risk of such driving. See Hossley v.
Union Indemnity Co. of New York (1925) 137 Miss. 537, 102 So. 561.
10. In Pietrantonio v. Travelers Ins. Co. (1937) 282 Mich. 111, 275
N. W. 786, the provision reads: "This agreement shall exclude any obli-
gation of the Company; (a) Under any of the above coverages, while the
automobile is used in the business of demonstrating or testing, or as a
public or livery conveyance, or for carrying passengers for a consideration,
or while rented under contract or lease, unless such use is specifically
declared and described in this policy and premium charged therefor." For
other examples of the same type of provision see State Farm Mut. Auto-
mobile Ins. Co. v. Self (C. C. A. 5, 1937) 93 F. (2d) 139; American Lumber-
men's Mut. Casualty Co. v. Wilcox (D. C. W. D. N. Y. 1936) 16 F. Supp.
799; United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Hearn (1936) 133 Ala. 31,
170 So. 59; Sleeper v. Massachusetts Bonding and Ins. Co. (1933) 283
Mass. 511, 186 N. E. 778; Gardner v. Boyer's Estate (1938) 285 Mich. 80,
280 N. W. 117; Orcutt v. Erie Indemnity Co. (1934) 114 Pa. Super. 493,
174 Atl. 625.
11. Elder v. Federal Ins. Co. (1913) 213 Mass. 389, 100 N. E. 655;
Record v. Royal Ins. Co., Ltd. (1925) 253 Mass. 617, 149 N. E. 546; Crowell
v. Maryland Motor Car Ins. Co. (1915) 169 N. C. 35, 85 S. E. 37, Ann.
Cas. 1917D 50; De Pasquale v. Union Indemnity Co. (1930) 50 R. I. 509.
149 Atl. 795.
12. In Commercial Union Assur. Co. of London v. Hill (Tex. Civ. App.
1914) 167 S. W. 1095, the clause is worded: "It is warranted by the in-
sured that the automobile hereby insured during the term of this policy
shall not be used for carrying passengers for compensation, and that it
shall not be rented or leased." For other cases involving promissory war-
ranties see: Crowell v. Maryland Motor Car Ins. Co. (1915) 169 N. C. 35,
85 S. E. 37, Ann. Cas. 1917D 50; Orient Ins. Co. v. Van Zandt-Bruce Drug,
Co. (1915) 50 Okla. 558, 151 Pac. 323.
13. In Mayor, Lane & Co. v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co. (1915) 169
App. Div. 772, 155 N. Y. S. 75, the clause provided: "None of the auto-
mobiles herein described are rented to others, or used to carry passengers
for a consideration, actual or implied, except as follows: No exceptions."
In this case the court construed the warranty as of the date when the
policy took effect, merely warranting that the truck was not rented at
the time when the policy became effective, applying the rule of strict con-
struction against the insurance company. The court distinguished the
case from Hygienic Ice & Refrigerating Co. v. Philadelphia Casualty Co.(1914) 162 App. Div. 190, 147 N. Y. S. 754, aff'd 222 N. Y. 583, 118 N. E.
1063, where a divided court expressed the opinion that a warranty with
respect to the use of vicious horses, although in the present tense, should
be deemed a continuing warranty as to use. Emphasis was placed on the
fact that as the horses to be used were not described in the policy, the use
was not limited to those then employed. The construction of the court in
Washington University Open Scholarship
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a combination of both.14 In some policies both the clause exclud-
ing liability and the warranty are included.15 The provision in
these various forms has been enforced as a reasonable limitation
of the risk by the insurance company, 16 there being no rule of
public policy violated since insurance companies have the right
to insert in their policies reasonable conditions as to use.
Undoubtedly, the provision against renting the insured vehicle
and against its use to carry passengers for a consideration was
originally adopted because it had been judicially determined in
many jurisdictions that a lower standard of care should be ex-
acted where the carriage is gratuitous,18 than in the case of
carriage for hire.19 For example, in Cartos v. Hartford Accident
the Mayor, Lane & Co. case is questionable inasmuch as the obvious purpose
of this type of clause is to exclude liability of the insurance company when
the hazard is increased by renting or carrying passengers for hire, and
whether or not the vehicle was being so used at the actual moment when
the policy- took effect would be of little importance. It does not seem that
the provision, although stated in the present tense, is ambiguous when the
obvious intention of the insurance company is considered.
14. The policy provision in Western Machinery Co. v. Bankers Indem-
nity Ins. Co. (1938) 10 Cal. (2d) 488, 75 P. (2d) 609, reads: "None of
the insured automobiles are or will be used to carry passengers for a con-
sideration, actual or implied."
15. In Beatty v. Employers' Liability Assur. Corp., Ltd. (1933) 106 Vt.
25, 168 Atl. 919, the policy provided: "This policy shall not cover: (a)
when any of the said automobiles are being * * * (4) used for renting or
livery use or the carrying of passengers for a consideration," and also
"None of the automobiles herein described is or will be rented to others or
used to 'carry passengers for a consideration during the period of this
policy." See also Neilson v. American Mut. Liability Ins. Co. (1933) 111
N. J. L. 345, 168 At]. 436.
16. Orcutt v. Erie Indemnity Co. (1934) 114 Pa. Super. 493, 174 AtL.
625; Mittet v. Home Ins. Co. (1926) 49 S. D. 319, 207 N. W. 49; Cartos v.
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. (1933) 160 Va. 505, 169 S. E. 594.
17. Crowell v. Maryland Motor Car Ins. Co. (1915) 169 N. C. 35, 85
S. E. 37, Ann. Cas. 1917D 50.
18. Arnistead v. Lenkeit (1935) 230 Ala. 155, 160 So. 257; McCann v.
Hoffman (1937) 9 Cal. (2d) 279, 70 P. (2d) 909; Epps v. Parrish (1921)
26 Ga. App. 399, 106 S. E. 297; Mayberry v. Sivey (1877) 18 Kan. 291;
Beard v. Klusmeier (1914) 158 Ky. 153, 164 S. W. 319; West v. Poor
(1907) 196 Mass. 183, 81 N. E. 960; Massaletti v. Fitzroy (1907) 228 Mass.
487, 118 N. E. 168; Flynn v. Lewis (1919) 231 Mass. 550, 121 N. E. 493;
Lyttle v. Monto (1924) 248 Mass. 340, 142 N. E. 795; Gasboury v. Tisdell
(1927) 261 Mass. 147, 158 N. E. 348; Murphy v. Barry (1928) 264 Mass. 557,
163 N. E. 159; Baker v. Hurwitch (1928) 265 Mass. 360, 164 N. E. 87; Birch
v. City of New York (1907) 190 N. Y. 397, 83 N. E. 51; Patnode v. Foote
(1912) 153 App. Div. 494, 138 N. Y. S. 221; McMillan v. Sims (Tex. Civ.
App. 1937) 112 S. W. (2d) 793; Cartos v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity
Co. (1933) 160 Va. 505, 169 S. E. 594; see cases collected in Note (1929)
61 A. L. R. 1252, and (1930) 65 A. L. R. 952.
19. Pennsylvania Co. v. Roy (1880) 102 U. S. 451; Southern R. R. v.
Crowder (1901) 130 Ala. 256, 30 So. 592; Lawrence v. Kaul Lumber Co.
(1911) 171 Ala. 300, 55 So. 111; Rocha v. Hulen (1935) 6 Cal. App. (2d) 245,
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol24/iss4/4
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& Indemnity Co.,2 0 the court said:
The duty owed by the operator to a person being trans-
ported for hire is much higher than that owed to a person
who is not being transported for hire; and the risk assumed
by the insurer where a car is being so used is much greater
than in the case of an automobile which is being used for
pleasure and ordinary business purposes.
The provision under consideration was doubtless inserted
by the insurer to exclude such more hazardous risk. It is a
reasonable provision both from the standpoint of the in-
surer and the insuring public.
Consequently, the violation of such a provision may be the di-
rect cause of the loss, since the use of the car to transport pas-
sengers for hire places upon the operator a liability and an
obligation much greater than is borne by the operator of a car
which is being used only for pleasure purposes.21 Such viola-
tion, therefore, constitutes an increase in the risk undertaken,
in that the insurer may become liable to paying passengers for
injuries resulting from the negligent operation of the automobile,
whereas there would have been no liability to persons carried
gratuitously.2 2 Therefore, unless this more hazardous risk, an
exceptional risk in the case of a car used for both business and
pleasure, was excluded from such policies by a clause such as
the one under consideration, every insured person would have
to pay a higher premium based upon the inclusion of such risks,
even though he may not intend to, and in fact never does use his
car in the more hazardous undertaking.23
44 P. (2d) 478; Morgan v. Chesapeake & 0. R. R. (1907) 127 Ky. 433, 105
S. W. 961; Taylor v. Grand Trunk R. R. (1869) 48 N. H. 304; Meier v.
Pennylsvania R. R. (1870) 64 Pa. 225; Fox v. City of Philadelphia (1904)
208 Pa. 127, 57 Atl. 356; Bremer v. Pleiss (1904) 121 Wis. 61, 98 N. W.
945; Dibbert v. Metropolitan Inv. Co. (1914) 158 Wis. 69, 147 N. W. 3.
20. (1933) 160 Va. 505, 516, 169 S. E. 594.
21. American Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co. v. Wilcox (D. C. W. D.
N. Y. 1936) 16 F. Supp. 799; Sleeper v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co.
(1933) 283 Mass. 511, 186 N. E. 778. In Hadrick v. Burbank Cooperage
Co. (La. App. 1938) 177 So. 831, the court distinguished the case involving
an automobile liability policy from one where the automobile was insured
against fire or theft, saying that in the latter case the infrequent use for
commercial purposes would not ordinarily be responsible for the loss, and
that that was the reason for the decisions allowing recovery in such
situations.
22. Silver v. Silver (1928) 280 U. S. 117; Myers v. Ocean Accident &
Guarantee Corp. Ltd. (C. C. A. 4, 1938) 99 F. (2d) 485; Sleeper v. Massa-
chusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. (1933) 283 Mass. 511, 186 N. E. 778; Cartos v.
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. (1933) 160 Va. 505, 169 S. E. 594.
23. Cartos v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. (1933) 160 Va. 505,
169 S. E. 594.
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Admitting all this, it has been contended2' by counsel that the
insurer should not be relieved of liability where there was no
causal connection between the breach of the policy provision and
the liability incurred, and some cases have so held.2 5 The weight
of authority, however, seems to be to the contrary,2 since the
liability of the insurer is a contractual liability as distinguished
from the liabilty of the insured to the injured person, which is
founded on the principles of tort liability.2 7 Thus the insurance
company has frequently been relieved of liability under such
a provision even though the loss actually incurred was not caused
or increased by a violation of the provision. Accordingly, the
insurer was not liable where the injured partly did not give any
consideration for the carriage, although some of the other pas-
sengers did ;28 and where he was not even a passenger in the
insured car, but was riding in another automobile with which
the insured car collided. 29 This result is reached on the theory
that in the case of carriage for a consideration, within the mean-
ing of the provision, there is a potential increase of risk against
which the insurer may provide in its contract, and therefore be
relieved of liability in case of a breach, regardless of whether
there is any actual increase of risk.
In recent years the legislatures of a number of states have
24. M;yers v. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp., Ltd. (C. C. A. 4, 1938)
99 F. (2d) 485.
25. For example, the courts in some cases have held the insurer liable in
spite of a violation of the provision against a person driving the car while
under age, where there was no causal connection shown between the imma-
turity of the driver and the accident which occurred. Hossley v. Union
Indemnity Co. (1925) 137 Miss. 537, 102 So. 561; McGee v. Globe Indemnity
Co. (1934) 173 S. C. 380, 175 S. E. 849; Bailey v. United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co. (1937) 185 S. C. 169, 193 S. E. 638. Also in a case involving
the liability of an insurance company for damage to an automobile by fire,
the court allowed a recovery against the insurer even though a promissory
warranty against using the car for hire had been breached, apparently
basing its decision on the fact that at the time the car was burned the
alleged forbidden use of it had entirely ceased, and the increase of risk by
the wrongful use, if there was any, had entirely determined. Crowell v.
Maryland Motor Car Ins. Co. (1915) 169 N. C. 35, 85 S. E. 37, Ann. Cas.
1917D 50.
26. Travelers' Protective Ass'n v. Prinsen (1934) 291 U. S. 576; Provi-
dent Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Eaton (C. C. A. 4, 1936) 84 F. (2d) 528;
Standard Auto Ins. Ass'n v. Neal (1923) 199 Ky. 699, 251 S. W. 966;
Adams v. Maryland Casualty Co. (1932) 162 Miss. 237, 139 So. 453.
27. See Witzko v. Koenig (1937) 224 Wis. 674, 272 N. W. 864.
28. Raymond v. Great American Indemnity Co. (1933) 86 N. H. 93, 163
At]. 713; Gross v. Kubel (1934) 315 Pa. 396, 172 At]. 649.
29. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Self (C. C. A. 5, 1937) 93 F.
(2d) 139.
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enacted so-called "guest statutes" of one kind or another which
require a high degree of negligence in order to establish liability
of a host to a guest. For example, the Ohio statute" provides
that the owner, operator, or person responsible for the operation
of a motor vehicle shall not be liable for loss or damage arising
from injuries to, or death of, a guest while being transported,
without payment therefor, in or upon such motor vehicle, unless
such injuries or death are caused by the wilful or wanton mis-
conduct of such operator or owner. The California statutes'
differs in that a right of action for civil damages by the guest
is denied unless the injury to, or death, of the guest proximately
resulted from the intoxication or wilful misconduct of the driver
of the car.
A guest statute enacted in Kentucky was held unconstitutional
by the Court of Appeals in 193232 on the grounds that it violated
the constitutional provision that all courts should be open and
every person shall have remedy by due course of law for an
injury done him, without denial or delay. It was also said that
it violated the constitutional provision prohibiting the legislature
from limiting the amount to be recovered for injuries, and the
provision giving a right of action for death caused by negligence.
It is probable that the insurance companies have been in a
large degree responsible for the passage of this type of legisla-
tion since, in numerous cases, collusion has been found between
the owners of insured automobiles and guests, so that the latter
might recover damages from the insurance companies for in-
juries incurred while riding in the automobile of the host. This
has been especially true where the guests have been relatives or
close friends of the insured.33 Thus it can be seen that the im-
portance of the provision against carrying passengers for a
consideration may be increased greatly where a guest statute
is applicable, inasmuch as the insured person may neither be
30. Ohio Gen. Code (1935) c. 21, sec. 6308-6.
31. Cal. Vehicle Code (1935) sec. 403. Conn. Gen. Stats. (1930) sec.
1628, contained the provision worded still differently and provided that there
should be no liability to a guest for injury, death or loss in case of accident,
unless such accident shall have been intentional on the part of the owner
or operator or was caused by his heedlessness or his heedless disregard of
the rights of others. This was later repealed, Conn. Gen. Stats. (1937) sec.
351d. For a general discussion of guest statutes, see Weber, Guest Statutes(1937) 11 U. of Cin. L. Rev. 24.
32. Ludwig v. Johnson (1932) 243 Ky. 533, 49 S. W. (2d) 347.
33. See Weber, Guest Statutes (1937) 11 U. of Cin. L. Rev. 24, 35.
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afforded the protection of the guest statute nor have any right
of recovery against the insurer.
Our problem then resolves itself into one of construing the
provision against carriage for a consideration, and of determin-
ing how the courts have interpreted such a provision in varying
types of cases where the liability of the insurance company was
disclaimed because of the violation of the clause in question.
Although in some of the earlier cases it was said that insurance
policies should be liberally construed to effect the intention of
the parties,8' the prevailing rule today is that a contract of in-
surance is construed in favor of the insured and against the
insurance company. 5 The contract is that of the company, 8 and
it is only fair and just that any doubt as to the meaning of its
own words should be resolved against it.3 Even though it is
34. Yeaton v. Fry (U. S. 1807) 5 Cranch 335; Allegre's Adm'rs v. The
Maryland Ins. Co. (Md. 1830) 2 Gill & J. 136, 20 Am. Dec. 424.
35. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Jackson (C. C. A. 7, 1938) 98 F. (2d)
950; First Nat. Bank v. Maryland Casualty Co. (1913) 162 Cal. 61, 121
Pac. 321; Allen v. Travelers' Protective Ass'n (1913) 163 Iowa 217, 143
N. W. 574; Monahan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (1918) 283 IMI. 136,
119 N. E. 68, L. R. A. 1918D 1196; Budelman v. American Ins. Co. (1921)
297 Ill. 222, 130 N. E. 513; Treolo v. Iroquois Auto Ins. Underwriters
(1932) 348 Ill. 93, 180 N. E. 575; Wold v. Glens Falls Indemnity Co. (1933)
269 Ill. App. 407; Weininger v. Metropolitan Fire Ins. Co. (1935) 359 Il.
584, 195 N. E. 420, 98 A. L. R. 169; Havens v. Home Ins. Co. (1887) 111
Ind. 90, 12 N. E. 137; Kentucky Home Life Ins. Co. v. Marks (1938) 274
Ky. 646, 120 S. W. (2d) "207; Hatch v. United States Casualty Co. (1908) 197
Mass. 101, 83 N. E. 398, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 503, 125 Am. St. Rep. 332,
14 Ann. Cas. 290; Turner v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. (1897) 112 Mich. 425,
70 N. W. 898; Pawlieki v. Hollenbeck (1930) 250 Mich. 38, 229 N. W. 626;
Gardner v. Boyer's Estate (1938) 285 Mich. 80, 280 N. W. 117; Rudd v.
Great Eastern Casualty & Indemnity Co. (1911) 114 Minn. 512, 131 N. W.
633, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1205, Ann. Cas. 1912C 606; Arms v. Faszholz (Mo.
App. 1930) 32 S. W. (2d) 781; Mathews v. Modern Woodmen of America
(1911) 236 Mo. 326, 139 S. W. 151, Ann. Cas. 1912D 43; Connecticut Fire
Ins. Co. v. Jeary (1900) 60 Neb. 338, 83 N. W. 78; Raymond v. Great
American Indemnity Co. (1933) 86 N. H. 93, 163 At]. 713; Jasion v. Pre-
ferred Acc. Ins. Co. (1934) 113 N. J. L. 108, 172 At]. 367; Rosenthal v.
American Bonding Co. (1912) 207 N. Y. 162, 100 N. E. 716; Mayor, Lane
& Co. v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co. (1915) 169 App. Div. 772,155 N. Y. S.
75; Gazzam v. German Union Fire Ins. Co. (1911) 155 N. C. 330, 71 S. E.
434, Ann. Cas. 1912C 362; Cottingham v. Maryland Motor Car Ins. Co.
(1915) 168 N. C. 259, 84 S. E. 274; Webster v. Dwelling House Ins. Co.
(1895) 53 Ohio St. 558, 42 N. E. 546; Cartos v. Hartford Accident & In-
demnity Co. (1933) 160 Va. 505, 169 S. E. 594.
36. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Lyon (Ky. 1938) 124 S. W.
(2d) 74.
37. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co. v. Kearney (1901) 180 U. S.
132; Reading v. Travelers Ins. Co. (D. C. M. D. Pa. 1938) 24 F. Supp. 394;
Szymkus v. Eureka Fire & Marine Ins. Co. (1904) 114 I1. App. 401; Pietran-
tonio v. Travelers Ins. Co. (1937) 282 Mich. 111, 275 N. W. 786; Marcus
v. United States Casualty Co. (1928) 249 N. Y. 21, 162 N. E. 571; O'Donnell
v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co. (1929) 50 R. 1. 269, 146 Atl. 410.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol24/iss4/4
1939] THE PASSENGER IN AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 507
sometimes stated that there is nothing ambiguous as to the
meaning of such a provision so as to require a construction by
the courts,38 still it is generally held that the burden is on the
insurance company to prove that there has been a violation of
the terms of the policy by the insured.
It must be conceded at the outset that there is a division of
authority in the construction and application of this clause.
All of the cases are in accord on the proposition that, under the
terms so employed, the protection of the policy does not cover
an automobile when used in carrying passengers for a con-
sideration, 4 unless the insurance company has estopped itself
from denying liability by some conduct upon which the insured
has relied to his prejudice,4 1 or has waived its rights under the
provision in question.4 2 The apparent divergence in the deci-
sions arises from the variety of fact situations which are pre-
38. American Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co. of Illinois v. Wilcox
(D. C. W. D. N. Y. 1936) 16 F. Supp. 799; Orcutt v. Erie Indemnity Co.
(1934) 114 Pa. Super. 493, 174 Atl. 625; Mittet v. Home Ins. Co. (1926)
49 S. D. 319, 207 N. W. 49.
39. Pacific Mut. Life. Ins. Co. v. Henderson (C. C. A. 5, 1931) 45 F.
(2d) 587; Church v. American Casualty Co. (C. C. A. 3, 1933) 64 F. (2d)
266; General Casualty & Surety Co. v. Kierstead (C. C. A. 8, 1933) 67 F.
(2d) 523; Federal Life Ins. Co. v. Zebec (C. C. A. 7, 1936) 82 F. (2d)
961; Western Casualty & Surety Co. v. Weimar (C. C. A. 9, 1938) 96 F.
(2d) 635; United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Brandon (1932) 186
Ark. 311, 53 S. W. (2d) 422; Cardoza v. West American Commercial Ins.
Co. (1935) 6 Cal. App. (2d) 500, 44 P. (2d) 668; Prudential Ins. Co. of
America v. Cline (1936) 98 Colo. 275, 57 P. (2d) 1205; Blake v. Continental
Casualty Co. (1935) 278 Ill. App. 232; Center Garage Co. v. Columbia Ins.
Co. (1921) 96 N. J. L. 456, 115 Atl. 401; Glogvics v. Preferred Acc. Ins.
Co. (1935) 245 App. Div. 817, 281 N. Y. S. 407; Conroy v. Commercial
Casualty Ins. Co. (1928) 292 Pa. 219, 140 Atl. 905; Hill v. Great Northern
Life Ins. Co. (1936) 186 Wash. 167, 57 P. (2d) 405. But see Raymond v.
Great American Indemnity Co. (1933) 86 N. H. 93, 163 Atl. 713.
40. Beer v. Beer (1938) 134 Ohio St. 271, 16 N. E. (2d) 413.
41. Myers v. Continental Casualty Co. (C. C. A. 8, 1926) 12 F. (2d) 52;
Commercial Union Assur. Co., Ltd., v. Lyon & Kelly (1916) 17 Ga. ADp.
441, 87 S. E. 761; Lunt v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1928) 261 Mass. 469, 159
N. E. 461; Rieger v. London Guarantee & Accident Co. (1919) 202 Mo. AD.
184, 215 S. W. 920; Neilson v. American Mut. Liability Ins. Co. (1933)
111 N. J. L. 345, 168 AtL. 436; Rosenbloom v. Maryland Casualty Co. (1912)
153 App. Div. 23, 137 N. Y. S. 1064; Humes Const. Co. v. Philadelphia
Casualty Co. (1911) 32 R. I. 246, 79 Atl. 1, Ann. Cas. 1912D 906; Baetty v.
Employers' Liliability Assur Corp., Ltd. (1933) 106 Vt. 25, 168 Atl. 919,
In Beer v. Beer (1938) 134 Ohio St. 271, 16 N. E. (2d) 413, the court
said that the participation of the insurance company in the defense of the
insured in the original proceeding did not estop it from setting up a viola-
tion of the carriage for consideration clause as a defense.
42. East Side Garage, Inc. v. New Brunswick Fire Ins. Co. (1921) 198
App. Div. 408, 190 N. Y. S. An insurer may waive breach of a stipulation
against carrying passengers for hire, but it does not do so by entering an
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sented in the various cases, each situation being judged on its
particular facts.4 3
There is considerable authority to the effect that such pro-
visions in automobile policies do not contemplate merely a
single act of renting, or hiring, or carriage for a consideration,"4
or other violation, ' but require something of a more permanent
nature, such as habitual use in the prohibited manner. How-
ever, a number of cases have said that such provisions are not
limited in their application to situations where the insured
automobile was habitually used for carrying passengers for
consideration.48
In any event, it seems to be the usual view that temporary
non-compliance with the provisions of an insurance policy of
any kind will not work a forfeiture, providing there was com-
pliance at the time of the loss, unless such provision constitutes
a warranty. The policy is merely suspended during the period
of - non-compliance and becomes reinstated when such period
ceases.-I However, there is authority to the contrary, some
appearance for an insured person who has concealed the breach, provided
disclaimer is made within a reasonable time after discovery of such breach.
Although the fact of estoppel or waiver is ordinarily a question for thejury, Marks v. Home Fire & Marine Ins. Co. (App. D. C. 1923) 285 Fed.
959, 52 App. D. C. 225, where but a single inference can be drawn from the
facts, established or admitted, it is for the court to draw such inference,
Center Garage Co. v. Columbia Ins. Co. (1921) 96 N. J. L. 456, 115 Atl.
401; Orctitt v. Erie Indemnity Co. (1934) 114 Pa. Super. 493, 174 At]. 625;
De Pasquale v. Union Indemnity Co. (1930) 50 R. I. 509, 149 Ati. 795.
43. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp., Ltd. v. Olson (C. C. A. 8, 1937)
87 F. (2d) 465; State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Self (C. C. A. 5,
1937) 93 F. (2d) 139; United States Fidelity & Guarantee Co. v. Hearn(1936) 233 Ala. 31, 170 So. 59.
44. Maringer v. Bankers Indemnity Ins. Co. (1937) 288 Ill. App. 335,
6 N. E. (2d) 307; Wood v. American Automobile Ins. Co. (1921) 109 Kan.
801, 202 Pac. 82; Berryman v. Maryland Motor Car Ins. Co. (1918) 199
Mo. App. 503, 204 S. W. 738; Crowell v. Maryland Motor Car Ins. Co.(1915) 169 N. C. 35, 85 S. E. 37, Ann. Cas. 1917D 50; O'Donnell v. New
Amsterdam Casualty Co. (1929) 50 R. I. 269, 146 Atl. 410; Commercial
Union Assur. Co. v. Hill (Tex. Civ. App. 1914) 167 S. W. 1095.
45. Treolo v. Iroquois Auto Ins. Underwriters (1932) 348 Ill. 93, 180
N. E. 575; Wold v. Glens Falls Indemnity Co. (1933) 269 Ill. App. 407;
Bloom v. Ohio Farmers' Ins. Co. (1926) 255 Mass. 528, 152 N. E. 345;
Cottingham v. Maryland Motor Car Ins. Co. (1915) 168 N. C. 259, 84 S. E.
274, L. R. A. 1915D 344, Ann. Cas. 1917B 1237; Allen v. Berkshire Mut.
Fire Ins. Co. (1933) 105 Vt. 471, 168 At. 698, 89 A. L. R. 460.
46. Myers v. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp., Ltd. (C. C. A. 4, 1938)
99 F. (2d) 485; Sleeper v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. (1933) 283
Mass. 511, 186 N. E. 778; Mittet v. Home Ins. Co. (1926) 49 S. D. 319,
207 N. W. 49.
47. Myers v. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp. Ltd. (C. C. A. 4, 1938)
99 F. (2d) 485; Insurance Co. of North America v. McDowell (1869) 50
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cases holding that a violation of the provision avoids the policy
entirely and does not merely suspend it during the time of the
violation.," This is especially true where the violation involves
a breach of warranty,4' such as one against carrying passengera
for hire."0
What factors, then, shall determine whether or not the pro-
vision has been violated in any individual case? The usual
definition of the term "passenger" in the legal sense of the
word is one who travels in some public conveyance by virtue
of an implied contract with a carrier, as evidenced by the pay-
ment of a fare or by that which is accepted as the equivalent
thereof."' Some of the cases have limited the effect of the clause
to situations of this type. On the contrary, there is a great deal
of authority to the effect that a person may be a passenger
for a consideration, within the meaning of the provision, when
IlL 120; Szymkus v. Eureka Fire & Marine Ins. Co. (1904) 114 Ill. App.
401; Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Hughes' Adm'r (1901) 110 Ky. 26, 60
S. W. 850; Hinckley v. Germania Fire Ins. Co. (1885) 140 Mass. 38, 1 N. E.
737; Greenleaf v. St. Louis Ins. Co. (1865) 37 Mo. 25; Mears v. Humboldt
Ins. Co. (1879) 92 Pa. 15; Sumter Tobacco Warehouse Co. v. Phoenix Ins.
Co., Ltd. (1907) 76 S. C. 76, 56 S. E. 654; Mittet v. Home Ins. Co. (1926)
49 S. D. 319, 207 N. W. 49; Kircher v. Milwaukee Mechanics' Mut. Ins. Co.
(1889) 74 Wis. 470, 43 N. W. 487.
48. McKernan v. North River Ins. Co. (D. C. E. D. Wash. 1912) 206
Fed. 984; German-American Ins. Co. v. Humphrey (1896) 62 Ark. 348,
35 S. W. 428; Jones & Pickett, Ltd. v. Michigan Fire and Marine Ins. Co.
(1913) 132 La. 847, 61 So. 846; Gray v. Guardian Assur. Co. (1894) 82
Hun. 380, 31 N. Y. S. 237; Insurance Co. of North America v. Wicker
(1900) 93 Tex. 390, 55 S. W. 740.
49. Imperial Fire Ins. Co. of London v. Coos County (1894) 151 U. S.
452, Northern Assur. Co. v. Grand View Building Ass'n (1902) 183 U. S.
308; Atlas Reduction Co. v. New Zealand Ins. Co. (C. C. A. 8, 1905) 138
Fed. 497; Mulrooney v. Royal Ins. Co. (C. C. A. 8, 1908) 163 Fed. 833;
Gilchrist Transp. Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co. (C. C. A. 6, 1909) 170 Fed. 279;
McKernan v. North River Ins. Co. (D. C. E. D. Wash. 1912) 206 Fed. 984.
50. Wood v. American Automobile Ins. Co. (1921) 109 Kan. 801, 202
Pac. 82; Elder v. Federal Ins. Co. (1913) 213 Mass. 389, 100 N. E. 655;
Sleeper v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. (1933) 283 Mass. 511, 186
N. E. 778; Center Garage Co. v. Columbia Ins. Co. (1921) 96 N. J. L. 456,
115 Atl. 401; Neilson v. American Mut. Liability Ins. Co. (1933) 111
N. J. L. 345, 168 Atl. 436; Orient Ins. Co. v. Van Zandt-Bruce Drug Co.
(1915) 50 Okla. 558, 151 Pac. 323; Beatty v. Employers' Liability Assur.
Corp., Ltd. (1933) 106 Vt. 25, 168 Atl. 919.
51. The Main v. Williams (1894) 152 U. S. 122; Marks v. Home Fire &
Marine Ins. Co. (App. D. C. 1923) 285 Fed. 959, 52 App. D. C. 225; Schepera
v. Union Depot R. R. (1895) 126 Mo. 665, 29 S. W. 712; Arms v. Faszholz
(Mo. App. 1930) 32 S. W. (2d) 781; Pennsylvania R. R. v. Price (1880)
96 Pa. 256; Bricker v. Philadelphia & R. R. (1890) 132 Pa. 1, 18 At]. 983;
Galen Hall Co. v. Atlantic City (1908) 76 N. J. L. 20, 68 Atl. 1092; Nor-
folk & W. Ry. v. Tanner (1902) 100 Va. 379, 41 S. E. 721.
Washington University Open Scholarship
510 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 24
traveling in an automobile ordinarily operated as a private, as
distinguished from a public, conveyance. 2
The fact that the clause prohibits the carrying of "passen-
gers" for a consideration does not mean that it will not be vio-
lated in a case where there is but a single passenger as was con-
tended by the insurance company in one case.53 Nor is the
clause inoperative, where passengers were carried for a con-
sideration, merely because the injured person did not pay any
part of such consideration,5 or because the injured person was
not a passenger in the insured car, but was riding in another
automobile with which the insured car collided." The same
should be true where the action is brought by a pedestrian who
has been injured by the insured car, although the violation of
the provision did not contribute to the loss.50
It is not necessary that consent by the owner of the car to
use it for carrying passengers for a consideration be given in
order to constitute a violation of the clause,57 and if the car is
so used, even though the owner is ignorant of such fact, the
insurance company is not liable.58 This is also true where the
owner has expressly forbidden such use or has stipulated by
52. American Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co. v. Wilcox (D. C. W. D.
N. Y. 1936) 16 F. Supp. 799; Neilson v. American Mut. Liability Ins. Co.
(1933) 111 N. J. L. 345, 168 AtL 436; Dziadosc v. American Casualty Co.
(1934) 12 N. J. Misc. 205, 171 Atl. 137, rev'd on other grounds 114 N. J. L.
137, 176 Atl. 150; Beer v. Beer (1938) 134 Ohio St. 271, 16 N. E. (2d) 413;
Cartos v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. (1933) 160 Va. 505, 169 S. E.
594.
53. In American Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co. v. Wilcox (D. C. W. D.
N. Y. 1936) 16 F. Supp. 799, the court said: "The rule of construction is
that singular number includes plural number in the interpretation of con-
tracts, and a contrary construction is only necessary where the plain intent
of the contract shows the contrary construction necessary to give effect
to the intention of the contracting parties."
54. Raymond v. Great American Indemnity Co. (1933) 86 N. H. 93, 163
At]. 713; Gross v.Kubel (1934) 315 Pa. 396, 172 AtI. 649.
55. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Self (C. C. A. 5, 1937) 93
F. (2d) 139; Neilson v. American Mut. Liability Ins. Co. (1933) 111 N. J. Ii
345, 168 Atl. 436.
56. See Maringer v. Bankers Indemnity Ins. Co. (1937) 288 Ill. App.
335, 6 N. E. (2d) 307. In this case, however, recovery against the insur-
ance company was allowed, because the court thought that the facts of
the case did not show that the insured automobile was used for the car-
riage of passengers for hire, either express or implied, within the meaning
of the provision of the policy.
57. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp., Ltd. v. Myers (D. C. M. D.
N. C. 1938) 22 F. Supp. 450; Mittet v. Home Ins. Co. (1926) 49 S. D. 319,
207 N. W. 49.
58. Wood v. American Automobile Ins. Co. (1921) 109 Kan. 801, 202
Pac. 82: Hadrick v. Burbank Cooperage Co. (La. App. 1938) 177 So. 831.
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contract against it.' The contrary is true, of course, where the
policy provision expressly states that no liability is assumed
because of accidents occurring while the insured automobile is
being so operated with the consent of the insured. 0 Where a
warranty is involved, the question of whether or not it has been
breached can never depend upon the knowledge, ignorance, or
intent of the party making it.61 The clause may also be violated
even though the compensation is paid by a third person rather
than by the passenger, inasmuch as the consideration does not
need to pass from the passenger to the driver in order to take
the former out of the relationship of guest,62 although it is pos-
sible for a person to be an occupant of an automobile without
being either a guest or a passenger for hire.8 3
In considering the problem further, it is helpful to attempt
a classification based upon the various fact situations which
are to be found in the different cases. In general, the cases in-
volving the question of carrying passengers for a consideration
may be divided into three groups.
Probably the case most frequently found is where the so-
called passenger has paid or shared in the operating expenses
of the trip, such as for gas and oil, either voluntarily, 6" or under
agreement' 5 made with the owner before the commencement of
59. Myers v. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp., Ltd. (C. C. A. 4, 1938)
99 F. (2d) 485.
60. For such a provision, see Orcutt v. Erie Indemnity Co. (1934) 114
Pa. Super. 493, 174 Atl. 625.
61. See Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co. v. Gunther (1885) 116
U. S. 113; Leonard v. Northwestern Nat. Ins. Co. (App. D. C. 1923) 290
Fed. 318; Matson v. The Farm Buildings Ins. Co. (1878) 73 N. Y. 310.
62. Smith v. Fall River Joint Union High School Dist. (1931) 118 Cal.
App. 673, 5 P. (2d) 930; Sullivan v. Richardson (1932) 119 Cal. App. 367,
6 P. (2d) 567; McGuire v. Armstrong (1934) 268 Mich. 152, 255 N. W. 745;
Dahl v. Moore (1913) 161 Wash. 503, 297 Pac. 218.
63. See Jensen v. Canadian Indemnity Co. (C. C. A. 9, 1938) 98 F. (2d)
469; Knutson v. Lurie (1933) 217 Iowa 192, 251.N. W. 147; Askowith v.
Massell (1927) 260 Mass. 202, 156 N. E. 875. But see Maryland Casualty
Co. v. Martin (1937) 88 N. H. 346, 189 Atl. 162.
64. Reed v. Bloom (D. C. W. D. Okla. 1936) 15 F. Supp. 600; Yelin v.
Columbia Casualty Co. (1934) 265 N. Y. 590, 193 N. E. 334.
65. Jensen v. Canadian Indemnity Co. (C. C. A. 9, 1938) 98 F. (2d)
469; Maryland Casualty Co. v. Martin (1937) 88 N. H. 346, 189 Atl. 162.
In Armistead v. Lenkeit (1935) 230 Ala. 155, 160 So. 257, the court said:
"Obviously, an arrangement by which the car owner agrees in advance to
transport another on a trip, which both wish to take, each contributing
thereto, one by furnishing the car and driving it, and the other furnishing
gas and oil, does not impose on the driver the degree of care required of
a common carrier of passengers. Neither does it impose the same obliga-
tions as a private carrier for hire, save in so far as like duties arise from
the intendments of the relation."
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the journey. It may also be that the guests on a trip, without
any agreement with the owner, have an understanding among
themselves that they will pay for the expenses of the trip.65
Ordinarily, such paying or sharing of expenses does not con-
stitute carrying passengers for a consideration.67 Thus where
the owner has received a certain sum per mile, it has been
considered merely as an approximation of the cost of operating
the car 8 For example, in Gardner v. Boyer's Estate,6D the
court said:
The transportation of a passenger in consideration of his
paying for the oil and gas is not at all an uncommon prac-
tice, and this cannot be deemed carrying passengers for
hire under the clause in the insurance policy. Policies are
most strongly construed against the insurer.
Nor does the sharing of expenses prevent a passenger from
being a guest within the provisions of a guest statute.70 One
court went so far as to hold that there was no violation of the
66. This was apparently the situation in Indemnity Ins. Co. of North
America v. Lee (1930) 232 Ky. 556, 24 S. W. (2d) 278, where the court
said: "It may be that if Cooper had agreed with the Lees and others accom-
panying him on the trip to take them along in consideration of their paying
for the gasoline, the case would be one where the car was being 'used to
carrying passengers for a consideration,' but it not infrequently happens
that guests on a long trip, without any agreement whatever with the owner
have an understanding among themselves that they will pay for gasoline,
or pay for it without such understanding * * * and, where this is the case,
they cannot be regarded as passengers for a consideration."
67. Reed v. Bloom (D. C. W. D. Okla. 1936) 15 F. Supp. 600; Ocean
Accident & Guarantee Corp., Ltd. v. Olson (C. C. A. 8, 1937) 87 F. (2d)
465; United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Hearn (1936) 233 Ala. 31,
170 So. 59; Park v. National Casualty Co. (1936) 222 Iowa 861, 270 N. W.
23; Perkins v. Gardner (1934) 287 Mass. 114, 191 N. E. 350; Gardner v.
Boyer's Estate (1938) 285 Mich. 80, 280 N. W. 117; Beer v. Beer (1938)
134 Ohio St. 271, 16 N. E. (2d) 413.
68. Park v. National Casualty Co. (1936) 222 Iowa 861, 270 N. W. 23.
But see Jensen v. Canadian Indemnity Co. (C. C. A. 9, 1938) 98 F. (2d)
469, where an agreement to pay a certain sum per mile was not considered
as a reimbursement to the owner of the car for operating expenses, but
rather as money paid for the use of the car, which constituted the carry-
ing of passengers for compensation within the language of the policy.
69. (1938) 285 Mich. 80, 280 N. W. 117, 118.
70. Rogers v. Vreeland (1936) 16 Cal. App. 344, 60 P. (2d) 585; Morgan
v. Tourangeau (1932) 259 Mich. 598, 244 N. W. 173; Ernest v. Bellville
(1936) 53 Ohio App. 110, 4 N. E. (2d) 286; Raub v. Rowe (Tex. Civ. App.
1938) 119 S. W. (2d) 190; see Olefsky v. Ludwig (1934) 242 App. Div. 637,
272 N. Y. S. 158; Eubanks v. Kielsmeier (1933) 171 Wash. 484, 18 P.
(2d) 48. But see Beer v. Beer (1938) 134 Ohio St. 271, 16 N. E. (2d) 413.
71. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Heam (1936) 233 Ala. 31,
170 So. 59.
72. Gross v. Kubel (1934) 315 Pa. 396, 172 AtI. 649.
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clause even though the payment of operating expenses included
the payment of the living expenses of the owner of the car
during the trip.7 1 However, it has been held otherwise where
the payment of expenses exceeded the cost of gasoline and oil
and included an amount intended to reimburse the owner for
the wear and tear on his automobile. 2 Also, where there is a
contract made in advance that the passengers shall share in
the operating expenses and pay the cost of gas and oil, it is
sometimes held that carriage under such an arrangement con-
stitutes carriage for a consideration.- In distinguishing the
various cases, the courts take into consideration all of the cir-
cumstances surrounding the particular case. They consider
the relationship of the parties to each other, that is, whether
or not they are relatives, friends, or absolute strangers; the
existence or lack of a common interest; the pleasure or benefit
to be derived from making the journey; the relation of the
amount of money paid to the actual costs of the trip; and
whether or not the dominating purpose of the owner of the car
was the carrying of passengers for a consideration."'
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Hearn,75 which falls
within this group, represents a liberal construction of the clause
in question in favor of the insured. In that case, Hearn and sev-
eral companions had agreed to drive from Alabama to Pasa-
dena, California, to see the Rose Bowl football game. It was
agreed in advance that Hearn would furnish his car and his
personal services as the driver, and in return his companions
were to pay all of the operating expenses of the car during the
trip and, in addition, Hearn's living expenses. During the trip
the automobile was wrecked and the passengers were injured,
resulting in a suit against Hearn. The Guaranty Company had
issued Hearn a liability policy covering his automobile and
containing an exclusion clause exempting the company from
liability when the car was being used for carrying passengers
for a consideration. The company filed suit under the declara-
tory judgment act to determine whether or not it was liable.
73. Sleeper v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. (1933) 283 Mass. 511,
186 N. E. 778; Maryland Casualty Co. v. Martin (1937) 88 N. H. 346, 189
AtL 162; Campbell v. Campbell (1932) 104 Vt. 468, 162 Atl. 379.
74. Ocean Accident & Guaranty Corp., Ltd. v. Olson (C. C. A. 8, 1937)
87 F. (2d) 465; Park v. National Casualty Co. (1936) 222 Iowa 861, 270
N. W. 23; Beer v. Beer (1938) 134 Ohio St. 271, 16 N. E. (2d) 413.
75. (1986) 233 Ala. 31, 170 So. 59.
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The court said that from the agreement it appeared that the
payment of the expenses by the passengers, even including
Hearn's living expenses, was only an incident and not a con-
sideration of the carriage. The automobile was shown not to
have been used, at the time of the accident, within the reser-
vations or exclusions of obligation contained in the policy, and
the company was therefore not relieved of liability.
On the other hand, in Sleeper v. Massachusetts Bonding and
Insurance Co.,76 Sleeper and one Ryerson were being driven
in New Hampshire by Stetson under an agreement that Stetson
should carry them from Boston to Meredith, New Hampshire,
and return, upon payment of "enough to pay for his gas, oil
and meals." Stetson had no personal pleasure or interest in the
journey, but was willing to undertake it upon those terms. He
received $8, besides his meals. In deciding that this constituted
the "carrying of passengers for a consideration" within the
meaning of the provision, the court said:
We think that whenever there is a contract, based on val-
uable consideration, having as its main purpose the carry-
ing of passengers, the insurer under the form of policy in
this case does not undertake to indemnify the owner or
operator against liability for an occurrence during the
journey covered by the contract. * * * The commercial ade-
quacy or inadequacy of the consideration, or the want of
profit to the owner or operator, is immaterial under the
terms of the policy.
The court distinguished Askowth v. Massell,77 on the ground
that in that case the division of the expense of operating the
automobile among members of a fishing party was held non-
contractual, and consequently the passengers were within the
class of guests. This distinction is questionable, inasmuch as
there was an agreement in the Askowith case that the expenses
of the trip should be divided among the members of the party,
and that each member should pay a proportionate share of the
cost for gasoline, oil and garage bills. It should be noted, how-
ever, that the cases might be distinguished on the ground that
in the Sleeper case the owner of the car had no personal in-
terest in the journey, so that the main purpose of the trip was
76. (1933) 283 Mass. 511, 514, 186 N. E. 778.
77. (1927) 260 Mass. 202, 156 N. E. 875.
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the carrying of passengers, while in the Askowith case the
owner of the car was personally interested in the fishing trip,
thus making it in the nature of a joint enterprise. Therefore
the carrying of passengers who would share the trip expenses
was secondary to the main purpose of the journey.
In Gross v. Kubel, 8 the insured car was being used to carry
a basketball team to an out-of-town game. An accident oc-
curred and the resulting injuries were the basis of a suit involv-
ing the insurance company. The court held that the insurance
company was relieved of liability because the arrangement for
compensation under which the owner of the car was carrying
his passengers was more than a mere reimbursement for the
gas and oil used on the trip, but went to the additional extent
of compensating him for the use of the car. In reaching the
decision that it did, the court, quoting from a statement of
the trial judge, intimated that if the insured had been paid only
a sum equivalent to the cost of gas and oil used, a serious ques-
tion might have arisen as to whether such a payment would
have constituted a carrying for hire. The additional sum paid
to him for the use of the car was thought to have brought the
operation of the car squarely within the clause of the policy.
There is a second group of cases where the passenger has
paid to the owner of the automobile a sum certain which has
no relation to the cost of operation of the car during the trip79
In this type of case the courts generally seem to have held that
the payment of such sum makes the carriage one for a con-
sideration. 0 Especially is this true where there is an absence
of friendship or relationship between the owner and the pas-
senger. In this type of transaction, the transporting is consid-
ered merely as a business arrangement, and the courts ordi-
narily hold that it constitutes the carrying of passengers for
78. (1934) 315 Pa. 396, 172 Atl. 649.
79. American Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co. v. Wilcox (D. C. W. D.
N. Y. 1936) 16 F. Supp. 799; State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v.
Self (C. C. A. 5, 1937) 93 F. (2d) 139; Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp.,
Ltd. v. Myers (D. C. M. D. N. C. 1938) 22 F. Supp. 450; Orcutt v. Erie
Indemnity Co. (1934) 114 Pa. Super. 493, 174 At. 625; Cartos v. Hartford
Accident & Indemnity Co. (1933) 160 Va. 505, 169 S. E. 594; Lewis v.
Bertero (1938) 77 P. (2d) 786, 194 Wash. 186.
80. American Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co. v. Wilcox (D. C. W. D.
N. Y. 1936) 16 F. Supp. 799; Elder v. Federal Ins. Co. (1913) 213 Mass.
389, 100 N. E. 655; Cartos v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. (1933)
160 Va. 505, 169 S. E. 594.
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a consideration within the provision of the policy, thereby re-
lieving the insurance company of liability.8
Within this classification is State Farm Mutual Automobile
INsurance Co. v. Self.82 Here the insurance company had issued
a public liability policy to one Woodhouse which covered the
operation of the car for pleasure and business, but contained an
exclusion clause of the type here being considered. The insured
desired to make a trip from his home near Phoenix, Arizona, to
a farm that he owned, located about one hundred miles south
of Tulsa, Oklahoma. Wishing to secure someone to make the
trip with him in order to help defray expenses, he went to a
public travel agency in Phoenix where he arranged to trans-
port five strangers to various addresses in Oklahoma City and
Tulsa, for a total sum of $37.50 or $7.50 for each passenger.
Woodhouse cautioned one of the passengers to say nothing about
having paid for his transportation. While carrying these pas-
sengers, a collision occurred between the car driven by insured
and another car driven by one Joe Self. The accident resulted
in bodily injuries to Self's wife and damage to his car for
which Self recovered a judgment against insured in a Texas
court. Execution having been returned nulla bona, Self insti-
tuted an action against the insurance company to enforce lia-
bility under the insolvency and bankruptcy clause of the policy.
The insurance company contended that the insured was, at the
time of the collision, carrying passengers for a consideration
and that such operation of the car was excluded from the cov-
erage of the policy. The court sustained the insurance com-
pany's contention, finding that the insured had been carrying
passengers for a consideration. The court rightly stressed the
fact that in this case the travelers carried were total strangers
to the owner of the automobile and they had no common interest
in the journey. The court also seemed to think it important that
the passengers were being carried for a predetermined and al-
ready collected fare which was fixed, not with reference to the
actual expenses of the trip, but at an arbitrary amount which
might have exceeded or been less than the actual cost of the
81. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Self (C. C. A. 5, 1937) 93 F.(2d) 139; Myers v. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp., Ltd. (C. C. A. 4,
1938) 99 F. (2d) 485; Orcutt v. Erie Indemnity Co. (1934) 114 Pa. Super.
493, 174 Atl. 625.
82. (C. C. A. 5, 1937) 93 F. (2d) 139.
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trip. These facts took the persons so carried out of the category
of contributing guests and made them paying passengers. The
court distinguished this type of case from the case where the
persons transported were friends or relatives of the operator
of the car and the payments made were unsolicited contribu-
tions. The court also distinguished Marks v. Home Fire &
Marine Insurance Co.,83 on the ground that the policy exception
there involved was carrying "passengers" for "compensation,"
while in the present case the exception was carrying "anyone"
for "consideration," which was much more comprehensive.
Myers v. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp.8 4 is an example
of a case which falls within both of the afore-mentioned groups,
as it involves both a division of the expenses of the trip, and
the payment of a predetermined fare for the journey. In this
case, the Bronart Company of Akron, Ohio, was engaged in
renting automobiles in Miami, Florida, and for that purpose
purchased automobiles in Michigan and elsewhere and had them
driven by employes to Miami. In order to cover any legal lia-
bility that might possibly result during such transit, the com-
pany procured, from time to time, endorsements on a blanket
liability policy which it carried with the Ocean Accident and
Guarantee Corporation, to cover particular cars as purchased
and driven from Ohio to Florida in this manner. The policy
described such automobiles as used for pleasure purposes, defin-
ing the term as including business calls, but excluding the rent-
ing or livery use of any disclosed motor vehicle and the carry-
ing of persons for a consideration. In January, 1935, the Bronart
Company made a written agreement with one Doris Goldman
to drive an automobile from Akron to Miami, for which she
was to be paid $5 upon arriving at her destination. The con-
tract provided that she was not to transport or carry in the
vehicle any passenger for hire or for any consideration, what-
soever, while she was operating it. Before leaving Akron, Miss
Goldman arranged with two of her girl friends to go with her
to Florida, and the three contributed to a common fund in her
charge for the purpose of paying their expenses on the trip,
including the cost of oil and gasoline for the car. When they
reached Cincinnati, they learned that a Mr. Manoff, his wife,
83. (App. D. C. 1923) 285 Fed. 959.
84. (C. C. A. 4, 1938) 99 F. (2d) 485.
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and a young man were seeking transportation to Florida after
the breakdown of their own car. Although these three persons
were total strangers to Miss Goldman and her companions, she
agreed to take them and their baggage to Florida. It was agreed
that they should pay $10 each for the transportation, and she
accepted the $30 and put it into the pool out of which she made
disbursements for gas and oil and other expenses of the trip.
No change was made in the intended route to Florida in order
to take the Cincinnati passengers. While the car was being
driven near Waycross, Georgia, it collided with a car in which
three members of the Myers family were riding. All three were
seriously injured and each instituted a suit against the Bronart
Company. The insurance company then brought a suit to obtain
a declaratory judgment to determine its liability under the
indemnity policy issued to the Bronart Company. It was held
that the policy did not cover the injuries sustained by the
Myers because of the exclusion clause and that the insurance
company was entitled to a declaratory judgment to that effect.
The court said that other cases have distinguished the situation
where the sum paid was a proportionate part of the expenses
of the trip, as where the driver and passengers were friends
engaged in a joint enterprise for mutual pleasure, the use of
the automobile being only incidental thereto, from the situa-
tion where a definite sum, not related to the expenses of the
trip, was paid by the passengers as compensation or profit to
the owner or driver of the car. Under this test, the arrange-
ment between Miss Goldman and her two friends before leaving
Akron would probably not be within the scope of the exclusion
clause, but the subsequent arrangement with the three persons
in Cincinnati would be. The fact that in the latter situation
the passengers were complete strangers to the driver and her
companions, and that they had no common interests except that
they were all going to Florida, was of importance, as was the fact
that the amount of fare to be paid for the transportation was
agreed upon in advance. The court said that this arrangement
was not only contrary to the literal wording of the exclusion
clause, but also violated its purpose and intent by increasing
the risk to the insurance company. The company might thereby
become liable to paying passengers for damages to them for
negligent operation of the automobile. The court also said that
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the possibility of accident was increased because of the neces-
sity of riding three in the front seat, thereby impairing the
driver's efficiency. The latter point is really of no importance
inasmuch as the risk to the insurance company might conceiv-
ably be increased at any time by three persons riding in the
front seat and, in the absence of violation of the terms of the
policy, the insurance company would still remain liable. Then,
also, it was not necessarily the violation of the clause that
resulted in the overcrowded car, as the clause might have been
violated with the carrying of only one of the fare-paying pas-
sengers. It is also interesting to note that in this case the
liability of the insurance company to the Myers family was not
increased by the use of the insured's automobile in violation
of the provision, since they were not riding in the insured
vehicle and the insured owed them no greater duty than if no
paying passengers were being carried. This fact, however, does
not deprive the insurance company of its exemption under the
exclusion clause.85
The third group of cases arises in situations where no mone-
tary consideration has passed to the owner or driver of the
car, but where some benefit has accrued by reason of the car-
riage, or where the transportation is for the mutual benefit of
both parties. Where some benefit has thus been conferred upon
the owner or operator, such passenger is usually not considered
85. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Self (C. C. A. 5, 1937)
93 F. (2d) 139. See also Universal Indemnity Ins. Co. v. North Shore De-
livery Co. (C. C. A. 7, 1938) 100 F. (2d) 618, involving an insurance pol-
icy which provided that the insurance company should not be liable "in
respect of injuries caused in whole or in part by any automobile insured
hereunder while being operated or manipulated by any person violating
regulations governing the licensing of motor vehicle operators, or when
driven by any person whose right to drive has been enjoined by proper
authority or whose license to drive has been suspended or revoked." The
court said: "It is not necessary that the violation of the licensing regula-
tions in fact increased the risk of the insurer in the instant case. It is
obvious that a practice of employing unlicensed chauffeurs would increase
the risk of the insurer and it is this general risk that the exception is
intended to eliminate. There are no facts in the instant case to show that
the unlicensed driver became any less skillful during the period he was
unlicensed; but we accept as a fact that the practice of requiring drivers
to be licensed is justified by experience as a sound safety measure. The
coverage exception in question affords the insurer legitimate protection
against a substantial risk which it is entirely proper for an insurer to
guard against." The same reasoning would apply to a situation involving
the clause relieving the insurer of liability for injuries incurred while the
automobile was being used to carry a passenger for a consideration.
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as coming within the category of "guest" within the meaning
of the guest statutes. 6 In a Massachusetts case8' the plaintiff
had agreed to give the defendant the use of her garage for his
automobile without paying rent, and the defendant, in consid-
eration of such agreement and use, promised to take the plaintiff
and her husband riding on such Sundays, evenings, and holidays
as she and the defendant might reasonably agree upon. The
court said that the jury would have been warranted in finding
that the plaintiff and her husband, riding in the automobile in
pursuance of such agreement, were not being entertained by the
defendant as guests when the accident occurred. However, in
other Massachusetts cases, where the benefit conferred was
somewhat more remote, such as securing a loan for the defen-
dant,8 8 bringing money from Boston to the defendant at Wor-
cester,8 9 and helping the defendant's daughter to select a new
fur coat,90 the passenger was still considered to be a "guest"
in spite of the benefit conferred upon the owner of the car.
It has also been said that where the benefit conferred was not
intended to be compensation for the transportation, the pas-
senger was still a "guest" within the meaning of the statute.9'
In cases where the transportation is for the mutual benefit of
both parties, the passenger is generally not considered as a
"guest,"9 2 the relationship being rather a joint enterprise.9,
However, the fact that he is not a guest does not necessarily
mean that he is a passenger for hire.9'
86. Crawford v. Foster (1930) 110 Cal. App. 81, 293 Pac. 841; Lerma v.
Flores (1936) 16 Cal. App. (2d) 128, 60 P. (2d) 546; Bree v. Lamb (1935)
120 Conn. 1, 178 Atl. 919; Brookhart v. Greenlease-Lied Motor Co. (1932)
215 Iowa 8, 244 N. W. 721.
87. Chooljian v. Nahigan (1930) 273 Mass. 396, 173 N. E. 511.
88. Jacobson v. Stone (1931) 277 Mass. 323, 178 N. E. 636.
89. Baker v. Hurwitch (1928) 265 Mass. 360, 164 N. E. 87.
90. Flynn v. Lewis (1919) 231 Mass. 550, 121 N. E. 493.
91. Chaplowe v. Powsner (1934) 119 Conn. 118, 175 Atl. 470.
92. Woodman v. Hemet Union High School Dist. (1934) 136 Cal. App.
544, 29 P. (2d) 257; Kruy v. Smith (1929) 108 Conn. 628, 144 Atl. 304;
Russell v. Parlee (1932) 115 Conn. 687, 163 Atl. 404; Johnson v. Smither(Tex. Civ. App. 1938) 116 S. W. (2d) 812.
93. Derrick v. Salt Lake &. 0. R. R. (1917) 50 Utah 573, 168 Pac. 335;
Wentworth v. Waterbury (1916) 90 Vt. 60, 96 Atl. 334; Jensen v. Chicago,
M. & St. P. R. R. (1925) 133 Wash. 208, 233 Pac. 635. But see Coleman v.
Bent (1924) 100 Conn. 527, 124 At]. 224; Fisher v. Johnson (1925) 238 Ill.
App. 25; Berry, The Law of Autow'obiles (4th ed. 1924) sec. 565; Wein-
traub, The Joint Enterprise Doctrine in Automobile Law (1931) 16 Corn.
L. Q. 320.
94. Knutson v. Lurie (1933) 217 Iowa 192, 251 N. W. 147.
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In cases involving the "passenger for a consideration" clause,
it seems generally to be held that the fact that a non-pecuniary
benefit has been conferred upon the owner or operator of the
car does not bring the situation within the meaning of the pro-
vision. 5
In a typical case coming within this group, Esther Rothman
brought suit against the Metropolitan Casualty Insurance Com-
pany to recover damages claimed to have been sustained by her
while riding in an automobile of the Malkin Furniture Company
of Youngstown, Ohio, being driven by its president. She had
visited the furniture store for the purpose of purchasing some
rugs and furniture and, upon expressing a desire to see certain
other rugs and furniture in Cleveland, Mr. Malkin took her to
Cleveland by automobile for such purpose. Some selections were
made there, and it was upon the return trip that the accident
and resulting injuries to Mrs. Rothman occurred. Having recov-
ered a judgment against the furniture company, Mrs. Rothman
filed a supplemental petition against the insurance company
which had insured the furniture company against such liability,
pursuant to the provisions of the Ohio General Code. The cas-
ualty company defended on the ground that at the time of the
injury the plaintiff was traveling as a passenger for a considera-
tion, which use was expressly excluded by the terms of the
policy. In holding for the plaintiff against the insurance com-
pany the court said:
In view of the fact that this automobile was insured as the
property of a business concern and, according to the terms
of the policy, is covered for business as well as personal use,
a strained construction must be resorted to if it be held that
under the facts above stated the automobile was being "used
to carry passengers for a consideration express or implied,"
at the time of the accident. When all the terms and condi-
tions of the policy are considered together, it must be con-
cluded that such use as that in question was contemplated
by the parties; at least, that it was not embraced within the
exception stated."
95. Western Machinery Co. v. Bankers Indemnity Ins. Co. (1938) 10 Cal.
(2d) 488, 75 P. (2d) 609; Pietrantonio v. Travelers Ins. Co. (1937) 282
Mich. 111, 275 N. W. 786; Jasion v. Preferred Acc. Ins. Co. (1934) 113
N. J. L. 108, 172 Atl. 367; Rothman v. Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co.
(1938) 134 Ohio St. 241, 16 N. E. (2d) 417; Central Surety & Ins. Corp.
v. London & Lancashire Indemnity Co. (1935) 181 Wash. 353,43 P. (2d) 12.
96. Rothman v. Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. (1938) 134 Ohio St. 241,
16 N. E. (2d) 417, 421.
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It should be noted that the facts that the insured was a business
concern, and that the policy issued covered business as well as
personal use, seemed to influence the court in determining that
the benefit to the owner of the automobile did not constitute a
consideration within the meaning of the provision. In such case
the court seemed to think that the automobile was being used
for business purposes within the meaning of the insurance con-
tract and that such use was contemplated by the parties as being
covered by the provisions of the policy. 7
The fact that the insured was a business concern is not con-
trolling, however, for the same conclusion was reached by the
court in Pietrantonio v. Travelers Insurance Co.,95 where the
insured was an individual. In that case the insured, at the time
of the accident, was demonstrating his car to the plaintiff as
a possible purchaser, ad the plaintiff received severe injuries.
The plaintiff brought suit under an assignment of the insured's
right against his insurance company. The company contended
that, since the car was being demonstrated to the plaintiff at
the time of the accident, he was a passenger for a consideration,
and therefore the company was not liable. The court dismissed
this contention as without merit, saying, "Plaintiff could not be
considered as a passenger for hire under any interpretation of
the exclusion clause." In a like manner, the court disposed of
a provision in the policy against using his car for demonstrating.
97. In Western Machinery Co. v. Bankers Indemnity Ins. Co. (1938)
10 Cal. (2d) 488, 75 P. (2d) 609, the passenger was being transported by
the insured company to inspect some machinery being offered for sale by
the company to determine whether the passenger's employer would buy it.
On the return trip an accident occurred through the negligence of the
driver of the car which resulted in injuries to said passenger. The posi-
tion of the insurance company in contesting the claim was that since
the passenger was not a "guest" within the meaning of the provisions of
the California Vehicle Act, prohibiting the recovery by a person injured
through the negligence of his host, he necessarily became a passenger for
consideration within the meaning of the policy provision, and therefore
it was not liable. No monetary or other valuable return for the transpor-
tation of the passenger, Lawton, was made to the insured and, therefore,
the claim of the insurance company can only be supported by holding that
the benefit conferred upon the insured by the subsequent sale of the machin-
ery to the passenger's employer amounted to a consideration within the
meaning of the clause in question. The court held that the insured was
not using the automobile to carry passengers for a consideration, either
actual or implied, and said: "the carriage of Lawton to inspect the machin-
ery was a permissible business use of the automobile and the rights of
the parties are governed accordingly."
98. (1937) 282 Mich. 111, 115, 275 N. W. 786.
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The court expressed the view that since it was a matter of com-
mon knowledge that a majority of automobiles were at some
later date sold by the original purchaser, and the buyer of a
used car would undoubtedly want to drive or at least ride in the
car before purchasing, the policies were written by the com-
panies and accepted by the insured with such facts in view.
On the other hand, in Rowan v. Allen,9 1 a non-pecuniary benefit
to the owner of the car was considered as sufficient to sustain
the finding of the jury that the owner of the car was conveying
a passenger in his car for a consideration, which would be suffi-
cient to remove the case from the Texas guest statute, although
the case did not involve the problem of insurance. 10 0 In that case
it appeared that the owner of the car, one Rowan, wanted to
take his wife and a Mrs. Allen in his automobile to the races.
The Rowans' son, aged nine, was sick and confined to his room,
and it was agreed that if Mrs. Allen would allow her daughter
to go to the Rowan residence and remain with the sick son, they
would take Mrs. Allen to the races. The court was of the opinion
that this arrangement was sufficient to constitute the carrying
of Mrs. Allen in the Rowan car for a consideration'' under the
guest statute. Under this decision the court might have found
that the exclusion clause under consideration had been violated
if the insurance question had been involved. This result, how-
ever, would be questionable, inasmuch as the insurance com-
99. (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) 113 S. W. (2d) 322.
100. In Loftus v. Peletier (1916) 223 Mass. 63, 111 N. E. 712, the
court held that the carrying of a district nurse, by a doctor, to call upon
a patient, under a contract of employment requiring her to accept the
doctor's automobile as the method of transportation when it was offered
to her, was sufficient to constitute a carriage for hire, and that it was not
a joint enterprise. The question of insurance was not involved.
101. In cases involving liability for injuries received in elevator acci-
dents, it has been held that the owner of the elevator is a carrier for
hire and must exercise the highest degree of care in providing for the
safety of the passengers. This is true although no fare is exacted for
carriage in the elevator. In the case of an office building the rental paid
by its tenants is considered as sufficient compensation and that is likewise
true in the case of hotels and apartment houses. In the case of a store,
the reward of the owner is considered to be the benefit, advantage, and
profit derived from purchasers or prospective purchasers. The prices
charged for goods would include reimbursement to the owner for the ex-
penses of running the elevator and hence would constitute a sufficient
reward for the carriage, bringing the owner within the category of a
carrier for hire. See Champagne v. A. Hamburger & Sons, Inc. (1915)
169 Cal. 683, 147 Pac. 954; Dibbert v. Metropolitan Inv. Co. (1914) 158
Wis. 69, 147 N. W. 3.
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panies in drafting such a provision, probably never intended that
the provision should be applicable to such a situation. Probably
the majority of the courts would so hold.
In conclusion, it seems evident from the ever-increasing
amount of automobile liability insurance litigation that the in-
sured automobile owner can never be absolutely certain that his
insurance will protect him at all times, since he may be inadvert-
ently violating one of the terms of his policy without realizing
what the consequences might be in case of an accident involving
serious injuries to others. The careless acceptance of compen-
sation, no matter how small, might take away his one means
of protection and wipe out his entire savings. Fortunately for
the insured, the courts have been sympathetic toward the policy-
holder and, wherever possible, have tried to avoid a forfeiture
of the policy. Only where the consideration has been the pay-
ment of a stipulated sum, agreed upon in advance, have the
courts uniformly relieved the insurance company of liability.
Any other type of consideration, whether pecuniary or not,
is usually not considered as a sufficient violation, in the absence
of other circumstances giving the transaction the appearance
of a business, rather than a personal, undertaking. In addition,
the intention of the parties involved in the transportation plays
a most important part in determining whether or not there has
been a violation. However, in spite of the leniency of the courts,
every policyholder should make a careful examination of the
provisions of his policy, and should conscientiously attempt to
comply with its terms. There still remains a construction of the
policy, of course, but in the absence of an intentional violation,
the courts will probably construe any doubt in favor of the
insured. On the other hand, if there has been an obvious viola-
tion of the contractual provisions of the policy, it is only fair
and just that the insurance company be relieved of liability
under its contract. The final result must necessarily always be
determined by the circumstances of each individual case.
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